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INTRODUCTION

Equality in Culture and Law: An Introduction to the Origins and Evolution
of the Equal Protection Principle
Lawrence Schlam
..............................
425
To set the stage for this symposium on emerging issues in equal
protection, this article introduces the reader to the historic culturaland
philosophicalorigins of the notion of equality in western civilization, the
antebellum state jurisprudenceon equal protection under law, and the
evolution of the meaning and use of the equal protection clause from the
passage of the FourteenthAmendment to the present.

ARTICLES

Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday's
Rationality Review Isn't Enough
Tim othy Sandefur ..................................................

When entrenched business interests, or any other faction, uses
government to prevent competition and protect their own profits, they
engage in precisely the behavior that the Equal Protection Clause was
intended to prohibit: preferring one group over another on some basis
other than individual merit. Because of this, the author argues that
courts should employ a skeptical scrutiny to the inequalities caused or
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maintained by government regulation and protect the equal right of all
Americans to pursue happiness.

The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justifications for Racial Preferences in
Public Contracting
509
M ichael K . Fridkin ..........................................................
Under Richmond v. J.A. Croson, if a government agency has
participated in the systemic exclusion of contractors on the basis of
race, the agency has a compelling interest in remedying that
discrimination by favoring contractors whose owners belong to the
previously excluded race.
This remedial defense of racial
preferences is the standard notion of affirmative action in public
contracting. Of great interest to the government institutions
employing racial preferences, however, is whether any non-remedial
objectives-separate and distinct from remedying discriminationmay be relied upon to justify the use racial classifications in public
contracting and what goals in particular are compelling enough to
satisfy strict scrutiny. In limited contexts, courts have held that the
non-remedial goals of racial diversity and fulfilling the operational
needs of government can be compelling reasons to depart from
racial neutrality. Municipalities may now consider arguing that such
compelling goals can justify racial preferences in public
contracting. However, such racial preferences must also be
narrowly tailored. The non-remedial goals of creating vital
economic development and enhancing public legitimacy may also
justify the limited and flexible use racial preferences in carefully
defined circumstances.

If Geronimo Was Jewish: Equal Protection and the Cultural Property
Rights of Native Americans
Sherry H utt .....................................................................
The Fourteenth Amendment should apply to Native Americans in the
same manner that it is applied to other groups within the United
States. In practice that has not been the case. The body of Indian
Law has developed around a "special" treatment for Indians that is
actually less than equal in effect. Such disparity is particularly
evident in the treatment by the courts of the cultural property of
Native Americans. The premise of the article is that if Native
Americans were afforded equal protection for their cultural property
rights then remedial laws would not be necessary. To illustrate the
disparity of treatment, the article contrasts the historical treatment
of Geronimo with the property rights of victims of Nazi era
confiscation of property, protection for rap musicians in their
intellectual property, and the protocols for victims in an airline
disaster.
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What Could American Indian Law Possibly Have to Do with the Issue of
Gay-Marriage Recognition?: Definitional Jurisprudence, Equal Protection
and Full Faith and Credit
563
Robert Laurence ..............................................................
American Indian law and gay-marriage recognition would not, at
first glance, seem to be fields of study related to one another.
Professor Laurence, however, finds three places where the two fields
conjoin.
First is what he calls the issue of "definitional
jurisprudence, " that is to say how does the law define its key terms "tribe" with respect to American Indian law and "marriage" with

respect to family law-and what are the jurisprudentiallimitations
on changing the traditionaldefinition? Second, to what extent do
the standard principles of equal protection jurisprudence vary
regarding such unique minorities as American Indians, on the one
hand, and those whose sexual orientation is out of the mainstream,
on the other? And third, regardingthe cross-boundaryrecognition
of local policy choices, how, if it all, does the tribal experience of
upholding ancient traditions against conflicting dominant society
norms relate to the question of whether states must adopt a
consistent definition of marriage?In the end, Professor Laurence
argues that the principles of American Indian law, while advancing
policies different from those at issue in gay-marriage recognition,
support the tolerancefor diversity that lies at the heart of the debate
over gay marriage.

The Wedding Bells Heard Around the World: Years From Now, Will We
Wonder Why We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?
M ark E. W ojcik ..............................................................
589
This article is a historical,international,and timely examination of
issues commonly raised by the marriage of same-sex couples in
anticipationof the impending changes in this area of the law in the
United States. Through a survey of important developments and a
comparison of the treatment of same sex couples vis a vis marriage
in various locales, the author argues that fears about recognizing
same sex couples destroying our country or the institution of
marriage are irrational,and that it is time now to recognize that
same-sex couples deserve the same recognitionandprotection of the
law afforded to opposite-sex couples. The author considers same
sex marriage and registered partnershiplaws in Europe, Canada,
and various states of the U.S.

Declare Victory and Go Home: The Practical Ramifications of the Seventh
Circuit's Interpretation of Missouri v. Jenkins in School Desegregation
Cases
Honorable P. Michael Mahoney and Scott R. Paccagnini ..... 683
The landscape of school desegregation cases has changed. While
all indicationsfrom the Seventh Circuit seem to point to an end to
school desegregation, such a presumption is unrealistic. Rather,
from a practical standpoint, what should be taken from the Seventh
Circuit'sinterpretation of Jenkins is not that school desegregation
cases are a thing of the past but that the manner in which they are
approached has changed. This article suggests that practically
speaking, a date for compliance with desegregation orders should
be set at the remedial stage of the litigation before another court
arbitrarilyimposes one.

Affirmative Action After Grutterand Gratz
M ark W . Cordes .................................................................

This article examines the state of race-conscious admissions
programsat institutionsof higher education after Grutter and Gratz.
Section A analyzes the general parameters established in Grutter
and Gratz in terms of what is clearly permitted and clearly
prohibited under the decisions. Section B then discusses three
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lingering questions after the decisions: when might permissible
goals for a critical mass become impermissible quotas, how much
weight can be given to race as a factor in admissions, and to what
extent can schools treat classes of underrepresented minorities
differently. Finally, the article briefly examines the most curious,
and potentially one of the most significant aspects of Grutter: the
Court's requirement that race-conscious admissions have a logical
endpoint to be constitutional and the Court's expectation that raceconscious admissions will no longer be necessary in twenty-five
years.

Caught in a Paradox: Problems with Grutter's Expectation that RaceConscious Admissions Programs Will End in Twenty-Five Years
Christopher J. Schmidt ........................................................
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court recently upheld the use of
race in academic admissions programs while apparently setting a
twenty-five year time limit on its use. The Court's opinion creates a
paradox as the reasoning allowing race to be used in admissions
programs contradicts a time limit for such programs. The Court
found achieving a diverse student body to be a compelling state
interest justifying race-conscious admissionsprograms. The benefits
of diversity that the Court mentioned (better race relations, better
learning outcomes, better professionals and better leaders) will still
exist in twenty-five years, thus, the apparent time limit seems
incorrect. Furthermore, the Court incorrectly concludes equal
protection's purpose was to provide colorblindness and equal
protection's norm is to provide colorblindness. Equal protection law
is actually designed to protect minorities and provide colorblindness
and throughout history race-conscious laws have constantly been
utilized, thus, race-consciousness and not colorblindness is the
historical norm. Finally, the Court concludes the remedial effect of
race-conscious programs will determine their fate, although
remedying past discrimination was not a compelling interest
justifying the admissions programs and a consensus exists that
racial equality will not exist in twenty-five years.
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COMMENTS

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Oil: Canadian and Gwich'in Indian Legal
Responses to 1002 Area Development
Michael T. Delcomyn .............................................
789
The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska contains an area
commonly referred to as the 1002 area. This area contains millions
barrels of oil but is currently protected from oil development by
Congress. Many groups support opening the 1002 area for
development, including the state of Alaska and the Bush
administration. Those opposing any potential oil development
include the Canadian government and the Gwich'in Indians. Were
Congress to open the 1002 area for development, Canada and the
Gwich'in would probably take legal action to prevent potential
harms associated with the drilling. Both Canada and the Gwich 'in
are concerned primarily with the negative effects oil development
could have on the Porcupine Caribou herd, which the Gwich'in
subsist on. Canada's legal responses could include a suit against
any oil companies and/or the United States government for direct
environmental harm occurring in Canada as a result of the drilling.

This suit could be brought using the Trial Smelter arbitration as
precedent. Canada's second suit could be against the United States
for damages stemming from America's violation of an existing
bilateral treaty by permitting drilling. The Gwich'in could sue the
oil companies under traditional environmental tort law for any
environmental damages to the 1002 area and the Porcupine Caribou
herd that result from the drilling. The Gwich 'in could also
negotiate or arbitrate with the United States government regarding
environmental damages under the Trail Smelter precedent, but only
if the Gwich'in are recognized as a sovereign nation.

The 1851 Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act: Should the Courts
Deliver the Final Blow?
M ark A . W hite ............................................................
This comment identifies the 1851 Shipowners' Limitation of Liability
Act as an enduring problem within federal maritime law and
suggests that the courts may be able to exercise their powers of
judicial review to strike it down. The Act was initially adopted at a
time when American shipowners were in dire need of protection
from potentially ruinous lawsuits. The Act, although hastily drawn,
was imperative to the growth of the fledgling American shipping
industry. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, numerous
forms of liability insurance had been created and America saw the
advent of the corporate form. These creations gave shipowners
layers of protection never before seen and made the Act no longer
necessary to effectuate its' original purpose. The Act, however, has
endured the years, and although many have called for its outright
repeal, the legislature has remained stagnant in their duty to do so.
As it stands today, the Act does little more than to frustrate the
needs of the victims harmed by the negligence of corporate
shipowners. The purposes of the Act have long ceased to exist and it
is now time to abandon the Act. This comment explains that the Act
is unconstitutional and may be struck down by the courts on equal
protection and due process grounds. Along the way, cases are cited
to illuminate the horrendous effects the Act has had on the victims of
marine accidents and the injustice that is inherent in this abhorrent
Act.
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